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In this paper, we develop a political economy model with a voting equilibrium to analyze 
the impact of remittances in the government’s redistributive policy. Remittances affect the 
distribution of income and the households’ demand for public redistribution. In this paper we 
consider the impact of remittances on two types of redistributive programs: a universal and a 
targeted transfer program. For an economy with targeted public transfers, we identify 
conditions in which an increase in remittances crowds out the social transfers of the 
government. If the redistributive program is universal then an increase in remittances 
actually increases the size of the government’s transfers. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The transfers of money by foreign workers to their home country, or remittances, are 
playing an increasingly important role in the economies of many countries. According to a 
report from the World Bank, the remittances’ flow to developing countries are estimated 
to reach 283 billions in 2008 and in several countries, such as Honduras, Jordan, Lebanon, 
and México, the share of remittances to GDP reaches significant levels.  
There is a growing literature that seeks to explain the dynamic growth of remittances 
and its economic effects. An issue that has received recent attention is the impact of 
remittances on the distribution of income of the donor’s home country, see for instance 
Acosta et al. (2007), Adams and Page (2005), Cox and Jimenez (1990), and Stark et al. 
(1988, 1986). In particular, Stark et al. (1986) identify conditions in which the recipients 
of remittances are predominantly high (low) income families. Consequently, the flow of 
 
* We would like to thank an anonymous referee for his (her) very useful comments. Of course, all 
remaining errors are ours.
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remittances is likely to increase (reduce) the inequality in the distribution of income which, 
in turn, might affect the role of the government in redistributing income.
1 
Moreover, from the perspective of fiscal policy design, it is important to study the 
interaction between private and public transfers because this issue is: first, closely related 
with the analysis of the proper versus the actual role of the government in the economy. 
Second, it is central in explaining the effectiveness of the government’s effort to 
redistribute income since the government’s tax and transfer policy might reduce the 
private transfers among families in the market economy which in turn might frustrate the 
government’s effort to redistribute income.
2 For these reasons, in this paper we are 
interested in asking the following question: Do remittances crowd out the government’s 
redistributive policy?  
Moreover, although there is substantial literature that examines how the government’s 
transfers crowd out private transfers, see Becker (1984), Roberts (1984), and Cox and 
Jimenez (1990), to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that systematically 
examines how private transfers affect the redistributive policy of the government. 
Therefore, there are interesting questions to be analyzed such as: If the distribution of 
private transfers from households working abroad change, such that the average size of 
remittances increases, then the government increases or reduces its role in redistributing 
income?, Is the government’s response to remittances the same if public redistribution is 
universal or targeted to the poor? 
To answer these questions, we develop a political economy model with a 
probabilistic voting equilibrium to analyze the impact of remittances on public 
redistribution. We choose a voting model to characterize the formation of the 
government because this model leads to empirically verifiable tests between the actual 
votes of citizens in the election and the policy decisions made by elected governments. 
In our economy, two parties compete for votes by selecting a tax on full income and 
a per capita transfer. Voters observe the parties’ redistributive platforms and vote 
sincerely for the party with the policy that is closest to the voter’s own views on public 
transfers. After the election takes place, the candidate winning the election forms the 
government and implements his platform on public redistribution. In this context, we are 
also interested in asking: what is the role of electoral competition in explaining the 
 
1 To see this, it is sufficient to recognize that policy makers might have incentives to use the tax system to 
redistribute in favor of low income families. For instance, the normative theory, see Tresch (2002), suggests 
that a benevolent planner might act on behalf of the society’s tastes for pro poor redistribution. The positive 
theory, see Mueller (2003), argues that policy makers might redistribute in favor of the poor to capture some 
political gains. 
2 Families might redistribute income if a high income family provides private transfers to a low income 
household (for instance the private transfer of a father to a son or vice versa). The literature, see Becker 
(1984) and Roberts (1984), suggests that the public transfers of the government crowds out the private 
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response of public transfers to remittances? 
In this setting, candidates select the tax rate on full income by considering: first, the 
electoral costs associated with the distributions of tax burdens and deadweight costs 
from taxation which in this economy are constituted by distortions of taxes on the supply 
of labor of households living in the country and crowding out effects of taxes on 
remittances sent by residents working abroad; second, the tax rate on full income raises 
public revenue which leads to higher public transfers that provide electoral support to 
parties. 
Remittances affect the parties’ fiscal policy by modifying the distribution of the 
voters’ preferences for redistributive policy. For instance, remittances received by 
households at the highest end of the distribution of income increase their full income and 
reduce their demand for public redistribution (since models of self interested agents 
suggest that redistribution is an inferior good) but also increase the demand of 
redistribution of households with lower than average incomes.
3  
Hence, remittances affect several aspects that are relevant to the parties’ political 
calculus of fiscal policy design; First, the private transfers sent by migrant workers 
change the distribution of full income of voters across the economy and therefore the 
households’ tax burdens. Second, remittances also change the distribution of the 
marginal utility of income across the electorate which in turn modifies the electoral 
gains from redistributing income. Third, an increase in remittances induces a positive 
income effect on the government’s budget constraint which tends to increase the extent 
of public redistribution.   
However, it is not obvious what is the net effect of remittances on the size of public 
transfers. The main contribution of this paper is the characterization of sufficient 
conditions in which an increase in the average size of remittances crowds out the 
government’s transfers in a targeted program but increases the size of public transfers in 
a universal program.   
In our economy, we can trace the response of the government’s transfers to an 
increase in remittances in two components: The first component is the effect of 
remittances on the tax rate on full income that finances the government’s redistributive 
program. The second component is a positive income effect of remittances on the budget 
constraint of the government. For an economy with targeted redistribution in which the 
electoral competition induces parties to produce moderate redistributive policies, the 
elasticity of remittances with respect taxes is inelastic, and the response of taxes from 
the government to changes in remittances is elastic then an increase in remittances 
induces both parties to reduce the tax rate on full income and the per capita social 
transfer. 
 
3 On the latter claim, it is simple to see that an increase in remittances received by households with higher 
than average incomes induces a positive income effect on the government’s budget which can be translated 
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In the universal program of redistribution, an increase in remittances does not affect 
the tax rate of equilibrium but affects positively the budget constraint of the government 
by allowing parties to collect more tax revenue that is translated into higher public 
transfers. Consequently, in a universal redistributive program, an increase in the average 
size of remittances increases the size of the government’s transfers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The households’ choice set is considered 
in section 2. The electoral equilibrium is characterized in section 3. Section 4 includes the 
analysis of the impact of remittances on the redistributive policy of the government. 




2.    THE HOUSEHOLDS’ CHOICE SET 
 
Consider an economy in which households residing in the country have preferences 
given by  2 / ) , (
2 l l − = c c γ μ , where c is consumption,  γ  is a positive constant, and 
] 1 , 0 [ ∈ l  is the supply of labor.
4 In this economy the distribution of preferences and 
abilities are identified by the density  ) (n h  where n is the voter’s earning ability (or 
labor wage) and γ   is the marginal utility of consumption. Then  0     > ∃ ∀ γ n : 
] , [ max 0 n n n∈  and  ] , [ max 0 γ γ γ ∈ . The opportunity choice set for resident consumers 
k k T t R n c + − + = ) 1 )( ( l  depends on the structure of the linear income tax system 
constituted by a tax 
k t  on full income and a public transfer  0 ≥
k T  proposed  by  some 
party k. The latter is positive in a universal redistributive program for all voters and can 
be positive or zero in a targeted program depending on whether the consumer 
beneficiates or not from public transfers. The wage income is  l n z =  and remittances 
are R. 
We rationalize why households working abroad send remittances by assuming that 
foreign workers are altruistic and care about the well being of their families living in 
their home countries. Our choice of rationalizing remittances throughout altruism is 
based on two aspects: First, the phenomenon of altruism has received significant 
theoretical attention, therefore altruism can be a relevant benchmark to compare with 
other approaches that seek to explain private, inter-vivos, transfers. However, in section 
5 we discuss other approaches that seek to explain why individuals provide private 
transfers. Second, altruism has some empirical support see Juarez (2009), Agrmal and 
Horowitz (2002), and Banerjee (1984) which makes this approach a relevant starting 
point for our analysis.
5  
 
4 The assumption of weakly separable preferences between consumption and leisure is for simplicity of 
the mathematical analysis. 
5 The evidence, however, on the altruism model of private transfers is mixed since several papers find 
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We consider residents working abroad with strict quasi-concave preferences 
)) , , ( , , ( n T t c
a a a υ μ l  where 
a c  is consumption,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈
a l  is the supply of labor 
with 0 / < ∂ ∂
a a l μ , and  ) , , ( n T t υ   is the indirect utility (to be fully characterized in the 
next section) of the family living in the home country of the migrant with  0 / > ∂ ∂ υ μ
a .
6 
The budget constraint for households working abroad is given by  R n c
a a a − = l  where 
a n  is the household’s earning ability with  ] , [ max 0
a a a n n n ∈ . For simplicity, and without 
loss of generality of our analysis, we ignore international taxes and transfers of migrant 
households.  
In this paper we also assume households have no mobility. This assumption is not 
because we consider the bi-causality role of migration and public policy is not important 
but because of mathematical simplicity of the model. In future research we will consider 
the impact of politically driven redistribution and migration. For the time being, we take 
as given both the distribution of migrant families working abroad and the distribution of 
resident households in the donor’s home country. 
 
 
3.    ELECTORAL COMPETITION UNDER PROBABILISTIC VOTING AND 
THE REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT 
 
In this economy, households have preferences over public redistribution which, 
among other things, depend on the individuals’ earning abilities. The heterogeneity of 
earning abilities in this economy leads to conflicts among voters over the extent of 
public redistribution. Therefore, the social choice problem for this economy is to find the 
society’s ideal size of public redistribution. The political institution that solves the 
society’s social choice problem is an election in which candidates of parties propose a 
redistributive policy, and voters observe the parties’ platforms and vote to elect a public 
official.  
We follow the literature on linear income taxes, see Romer (1975) and Roberts 
(1977), by considering a democracy with a single unit of government and a majoritarian 
 
evidence that is not consistent with the altruism motivation of private transfers, for a brief review of this 
evidence see Cox (1987) and more recently Juarez (2009). 
6  This characterization means that households living abroad seek to maximize their well being by 
deciding their supply of labor and the size of remittances given their preferences and budget constraint, and 
the preferences and budget constraint of their families in their home countries. At this point we use a general 
characterization of the indirect utility function of the family of the migrant living in the home country 
because this function will change depending whether the redistributive program is targeted or universal for 
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electoral system in which the winner takes all.
7 Parties seek to maximize their 
probability of winning the election,  ) , (
k k k T t π , where 
k t  and 
k T  are the fiscal 
policies proposed by parties  } , { Right Left k = . Voters observe the parties’ platforms 
and vote for the party with the tax system that is closest to the voters’ own preferences 
over public redistribution. We assume that only residents of the home country have 
voting rights while those individuals who have migrated abroad (the remittances’ 
donors) have no voting rights.
8  
Voters are rational and recognize the fiscal exchange, that is, taxes raise public 
revenue to finance the public transfers that the government provides to eligible 
households. The preferences of a voter over public redistribution depend on the voter’s 
relative position in the distribution of income. Self interested voters with higher (lower)   
because they pay higher (lower) than average taxes. To capture the voter’s fiscal 
exchange from the government’s redistributive policy, we characterize the ideal fiscal 
policy of a voter type n by  ) , , ( max arg ) ( ), (
* * n T t n T n t υ ∈  subject to  )) ( , , ( t R n t T T = , 
where ) , , ( n T t υ  is the indirect utility subject to the public budget constraint in which 
the per capita public transfer T is financed by taxation.   
Candidates design fiscal policy by considering the probability that a voter type n 
votes for party k. This probability is given by  )) ( ( Pr n
k k ψ  where 
) , , ( ) , , ( ) ( n T t n T t n
k k k k k k k − − − − = υ υ ψ  and  k k t R n t T T
k k k k − ∀ = ,    )) ( , , ( . The term 
) (n
k ψ  is the net utility for voter type n if party k is elected, and  ) , , ( n T t
k k k υ  subject 
to  k k t R n t T T
k k k k − ∀ = , )) ( , , (  is the utility of the voter when party k selects policies 
k t  and 
k T . Define  ) (⋅
k f   as the distribution of the marginal probability function over 
) (n
k ψ . The probability that an individual type n votes for party k is 
 
)) ( ( )) ( ( ) Pr(
) (  
n F d n f k for voting n




= =∫ ∞ −
,                      ( 1 )  
 
where ] 1 , 0 [ : →
k k F ψ  is a common, continuous, non decreasing function of  ) (n
k ψ . 
 
7 The tax structure we study in this paper is also equivalent to a general consumption tax. Therefore our 
analysis is not only relevant to developed countries that depend heavily on income taxation but also for 
developing countries that depend more heavily on commodity taxation.   
8 This assumption is made for simplicity of the model; however, the assumption has empirical support 
since half of the countries in the world do not grant the right to vote to those citizens who are temporarily or 
permanently absent from their own country. For further reading on this issue, see the document “handbook on 
external voting” by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance at http://www.idea.int/ 
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The proportion of expected votes for party k in the election is given by 
k φ  such  that  
 








ψ φ ∫ = .                                           ( 2 )  
 
The probability that party k wins the election is denoted by the cumulative 
distribution over the plurality of parties then  ] 1 , 0 [ : → −
−k k k W φ φ  is a continuous, 
concave function of 
k t , and  ) (
k k k k w W
− − = ′ φ φ  is the marginal probability over the 
plurality of party k denoted by 
k k k − − = φ φ ρ .
9 The probability that party k wins the 
election is characterized by 
 
k k k k k d w
k






− =∫ .                                             ( 3 )  
 
The problem of tax policy design for candidates  } , { Right Left k =  is to select 
k t  
that maximizes their probability of winning the election subject to the public budget 
constraint 
k T  (defined below). Formally, the problem is 
 

























ρ φ φ π
ρ
                              ( 4 )  
 
The politico-economic equilibrium of this economy involves the strategic interaction 
of parties, resident households voting in the election, and households working abroad. In 
figure 1 we depict a three stage dynamic game in which the payoffs of all players are 
common knowledge. Parties move in the first stage by announcing their tax platforms to 
maximize their probability of winning the election. 
In the second stage of the game, voters (residents of the country) observe the parties’ 
policies and decide their supply of labor, consumption and their choice of the vote that 
maximizes their well being. The economic choices of resident households recognize 
their preferences and their budget constraint while their voting behavior is determined 
by their own preferences over the government’s redistributive policy and the policy 
platforms of parties. Voters vote for the party’s platform that is closest to their own 
 
9 The assumption of the concavity of  k π is commonly used in the probabilistic theory of voting, see 
Coughlin 1992, and in its applications to fiscal policy design, see Hettich and Winer (1999) and Mueller 
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Figure 1.    Redistribution for an Economy with Remittances 
 
 
Moreover, in the second stage of the game, the remittances’ donors also observe the 
parties’ tax and transfer policies and maximize their well being by deciding their supply 
of labor, consumption, and the size of remittances given their preferences and budget 
constraint, and the preferences and budget constraint of their families in their home 
countries.
10 
In the third stage, the party winning the election implements its tax and transfer 
platform. In our economy parties commit to their tax platforms, therefore the party that 
wins the election implements its campaign’s tax platform. Therefore, the dynamic 
inconsistency problem between the parties’ campaign promises and the policies 
implemented by parties while they hold office do not arise in our economy since our 
candidates are Downsian and they select policies to win and hold public office (they do 
so because, in the Downs’ model, candidates seek the prestige of holding public 
office).
11 
Our model is different to the class of models in which parties have preferences over 
policy (these preferences could be characterized by the tastes for policy of a 
representative member-activist inside the party) and are dynamically inconsistent see 
Wittman (1973), Alesina (1987) and Roemer (1997, 2001).
12 In the latter case, parties 
 
10  The dotted line in Figure 1 means that the moves of recipients and donors of remittances are 
simultaneous. 
11 To see this, note that proposing (in the first stage) and implementing (in the third stage) a tax and 
transfer policy that maximizes the party’s probability of winning the election is sequentially rational. That is, 
for Downsian parties, there are no profitable deviations from the strategy prescribed above. 
12 Wittman (1973) is the first to point out that parties might have preferences for public policy and might 
 
Parties select a 
tax  k t*  and a 
corresponding 
public transfer 
k T*  
Resident voters select 
their supply of labor, 
consumption, and vote 
for a party to form the 
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Households working 
abroad decide their 
consumption, labor 
supply, and the size 
of remittances
The party winning 
the election 
implements  k t*  
and  k T*  DO REMITTANCES CROWD OUT THE GOVERNMENT’S REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY?  53 
campaign median or average voter policies but their campaign promises are not 
dynamically consistent because, after the election, the party winning the election 
implements the ideal policy of a representative activist inside the party.
13  
Formally our model is characterized as follows:   
 
Definition  The subgame perfect Nash politico-economic equilibrium for this 
economy is characterized as follows: 
a)   In the first stage, parties select a tax 
k t
*  and a corresponding public transfer 
k T
* such that: 
 
} , {     ) ( max arg
 
* Right Left k d w t
k k k k k k
k
= ∀ − = ∈
−
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dn n t R n t n t n h T to subject
a k k k
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If  0 ) ( < n
k ψ , they vote for party –k. 
 
c)  In the third stage, all households working abroad type  ] , [ max 0
a a a n n n ∈  decide 
their labor supply  ) , (
* * a k a n t l , consumption  ) , (
* * a k a n t c , and the size of  remittances 
) , (
* * a k n t R  to maximize their utility such that:
15 
 
not select policies to win the election (as it is argued by Downs, 1957) but seek to win the election to design 
policies. Alesina (1987) emphasizes the dynamic inconsistency problem and provides an application of 
partisan political competition with dynamic inconsistent parties to explain monetary policy, and Roemer 
(1997, 2001) provides applications to the analysis of taxation. 
13 We could expect that parties with preferences over public policy campaign the ideal policy of the 
median voter in Downsian models of perfect information and the ideal policy of the average voter in 
Downsian models of imperfect information since these strategies maximize their probability of winning the 
election and are sequentially rational. For details of the differences of these strategies see Mueller (2003). 
14 Voters vote with probability  2 / 1 for any party if  0 ) ( = n k ψ  for  all  ] , [ max 0 n n n∈ . 
15 It should be noted that the policies characterized in (a) are sequentially rational since the parties’ tax 
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Our definition of the politico-economic equilibrium recognizes that a rational 
household working abroad decides the size of remittances taking into account the impact 
that taxes and public transfers have on the economic well being of their families living in 
their home country. Proposition 1 characterizes conditions in which the best response, 
) , (
* a k n t R , of remittances sent by households living abroad on taxes satisfies 
0 /
* ≤
k dt dR . Formally, 
 
Proposition 1 The best response of the remittances sent by households working 
abroad is given by  ) , (
* a k n t R  satisfying  0 /
* ≤
k dt dR . 
 
Proof 
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max arg ) , ( ), , ( ), , (
* * * * * * υ μ
.           (5) 
 
The first order conditions for households working abroad are:
16 
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l μ μ μ
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With 0 ) , (
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and transfer policies incorporate the best responses of voters and donors’ of remittances. The voters’ best 
responses over the choice of the vote are given by  ) (n k ψ   which includes the indirect utilities of individuals 
and incorporate their ideal choices on consumption and supply of labor. In addition,  ) ( * * k t R  is the best 
response of donors of remittances to the parties’ tax and transfer policies. 
16  From (6) and (7) we obtain  ) , ( * * a k a n t l  and  ) , ( * * a k n t R  while  ) , ( * * a k a n t c  is obtained by 
imposing  ) , ( * * a k a n t l  and  ) , ( * * a k n t R   in the budget constraint, that is,  = ) , ( * * a k a n t c  
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. By assumption,  )) , , ( , , ( n T t c
a a a υ μ l   is a strict quasi- 
concave preference relation which implies that  a H
μ  is a negative definite matrix 
therefore 0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂
a a l μ  and  0 } / { } / }{ / {
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Because  0 > a H









, and  0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂
a a l μ  then  0 / ≤ dt dR . The size of 
remittances falls or remains unchanged with increases in the optimal tax rate on full 
income.■ 
 
Condition (7) shows that two factors explain the size of remittances: first, the 
 
17  To obtain the first order conditions use  ) , ) 1 )( (( ) , , (
* * * * l l
k k k k T t R n n T t + − + = μ υ  to state the 
following:  )) , ( , ) 1 ( ) , ( (( , , ( )) , , ( , , ( * * * n t T t R n T n R n n T t c k k k a a a a a a a l l l l l + − + − = μ μ υ μ . From the 
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opportunity cost for the donor of sending $1 to relatives (this is 
a a c ∂ ∂ − / μ ). Second, the 
marginal utility gain for the donor of the last $1 sent to a relative in the donor’s home 





















 is the change in the 
well being of the donor from remittances.  
The possibility that the government’s actions might crowd out monetary transfers 
among families (the result in proposition 1) has been first pointed out by Becker (1984) 
and Bernheim et al. (1985).
18  Here we just identify conditions that imply this result. Full 
crowding out of the government’s taxes on remittances occurs when the condition 
0 / < dR d
a μ  is satisfied for a given tax 
k t , while some partial crowding out occurs when 
0 / = dR d
a μ  such that  0 ) , (
* * >
a k n t R .  
In our economy, the optimal redistributive policy of the government at the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium takes into account the crowding out possibilities discussed 
above. For mathematical tractability, we consider only the case in which the marginal effect 
of taxes on private transfers,  0 / ) , (
* < = χ
k a k dt n t dR  satisfies  0 / ) , (
2 2 = t d n t R d
a k , 
and the elasticity of remittances and taxes given by  } / }{ / ) , ( {
* * R t dt n t dR
k k a k
t R = − ε  
0 < =ε  is constant. 
 
 
4.    TARGETED AND UNIVERSAL PUBLIC REDISTRIBUTION AND 
REMITTANCES 
 
In this section we analyze the impact of remittances on the size of transfers of the 
government. We consider two types of redistributive programs that have received 
attention in the literature: on the normative theory of public economics, the analysis over 
targeted versus universal redistribution has been centered around the tradeoff between 
equity and efficiency see Saez (2006) and Thresch (2002). Targeted redistributive 
programs are considered to produce lower deadweight costs from taxation relative those 
of universal programs but also tend to penalize more heavily the effort of low income 
families who are in the vicinity of the poverty line by creating high differentials in their 
taxes and public transfers.   
The theory of political economy has also been interested in the comparative analysis 
of targeted versus universal public programs, see Myerson (1993) and Persson and 
Tabellini (2005). In particular, some branch of this theory is interested in studying how 
political institutions (i.e., the structure of electoral systems) create incentives to policy 
makers to design public programs with broad benefits versus public programs that seek 
 
18 There is also empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the government’s fiscal policies crowd 
out private transfer. For a survey on this issue see Cox and Jimenez (1990). DO REMITTANCES CROWD OUT THE GOVERNMENT’S REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY?  57 
to benefit minorities. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001a) are interested in explaining why 
governments implement inefficient targeted redistribution. They argue that if the 
political process can not commit to future policy (rents), inefficient redistribution is a 
tool to sustain the political power of a special interest group.   
In a targeted program of transfers to the poor, only those individuals with earning 
abilities below a predetermined earning ability threshold receive transfers from the 
government. In our economy,  n ~  is the cutoff point that divides the participation earning 
ability threshold, therefore all individuals with  n n ~ ≤  are poor and eligible for public 
transfers while individuals with earning abilities higher than  n ~  are not eligible for social 
transfers. We also analyze a universal public program in which all individuals in the 
economy receive transfers from the government.   
The rest of the analysis of this section is structured as follows: in proposition 2 we 
identify the optimal labor supply of poor and non poor households under the different 
redistributive programs analyzed in this paper. These results are then used to characterize 
proposition 3 which contains the government’s response to remittances when public 
transfers are targeted to the poor, while proposition 4 considers the reaction of the 
government to remittances when the redistributive program is universal.  
 
Proposition 2 For an economy in which a tax 
k t  is applied to full income of all 
resident households and social transfers can be universal or targeted to the poor, the 
supply of labor of poor and non poor households are characterized by 
 
] , [ ) 1 ( ) , ( max 0
* n n n t n n t
k k ∈ ∀ − = l .                                     ( 1 0 )  
 
Proof 
We omit the formal characterization of the households’ labor supply. The result, 
however, is trivial we just solve the first order conditions of the household’s problem to 
obtain ) , (
* n t
k l .■ 
 
Proposition 3 For an economy with a tax on full income with  0
* > t  and the 
government’s redistributive efforts targeted to the poor, there is a crowding out effect of 
remittances on the size of the per capita social transfer of the government if 
 
a) The elasticity of the government’s response of taxes to changes in remittances, 
] 1 , ( − −∞ ∈ −R t ξ  is negative and elastic or unitary, and 
 
b) The remittance-tax elasticity  * t R− ε  is inelastic.
19 
 
19 The assumption that the remittance-tax elasticity is inelastic has empirical support. For a review of this 
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Proof 
See the appendix.■ 
 
Proposition 3 identifies sufficient conditions in which a change in remittances 
crowds out the government’s transfer policy.
20 In our economy, all parties converge in 
selecting 
* * * t t t
k k = =
−  and 
* * * T T T
k k = =
−  (see the appendix) and the response of the 
government’s transfers to a change in remittances depends on: first, the effect of 
remittances on the tax rate of equilibrium 
* t  with transfers 
* T  changing in the same 
direction as the change of 
* t . Second, a positive income effect of remittances on the 
budget constraint of the government that tends to increase 
* T . 
Condition (3.2) is a sufficient condition in which an increase in remittances reduces 
* t . In this case, the first effect of remittances tends to reduce 
* T  while the second effect 
tends to increase it. Condition (3.1) is a sufficient condition for the first effect to dominate 
the second effect leading to the outcome in which an increase in remittances implies a fall 
of 
* T . To see this, let’s define  ] [ /
* R dE dT  and  ] [ /
* R dE dt  as the marginal changes in 
the equilibrium fiscal instruments 
* T  and 
* t  due to a change in the average size of 
remittances ] [R E .
21 
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l  while 
* t  is the positive income effect 
of remittances on the budget constraint of the government. 
In proposition 3 we show that parties set the tax rate on full income at the point in 
which the electoral costs and gains from a marginal change in 
* t  are equalized (see 
condition A.1 in the appendix). The parties’ political calculus is the following: On the 
one hand, an increase in 
* t  creates disincentive effects that lead to a net fall in 
remittances, labor income, and the consumption opportunities of all households. In this 
 
evidence see Cox and Jimenez (1990). 
20 On what follows, and to save space, we just simply refer to an increase in remittances when there is a 
change in the distribution of remittances such that the new distribution has a higher mean of remittances. 
21 Assuming a change in the average size of remittances  ] [R E  is a shortcut to consider the case in which 
the earning ability of some donors increase and leads to higher remittances sent by the donors to resident 
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case, an increase in 
* t  leads to a loss on the voters’ welfare and to an increase in the 
marginal electoral costs from taxation for parties. On the other hand, higher 
* t  leads to 
higher tax revenue and public transfers. This, in turn, increases the parties’ electoral 
support. 
In a targeted redistributive program, if the elasticity of foreign transfers to taxation, 
* t R− ε , is inelastic then the parties’ electoral costs and gains from a marginal change in 
* t   are positively related with the size of remittances. To see this, note that tax revenues 
from remittance-income is given by  )] ( [
* * t R E t . Derive this expression with respect to 
* t  to see that the marginal public transfers that can be financed by remittance-tax 
revenue is  ] [ ) 1 ( * R E
t R− −ε .  
Hence, a marginal increase in 
* t  causes two effects on public transfers: one is a 
direct increase in tax revenues, which is given by  ] [R E , and the other is a disincentive 
effect of 
* t  on  ] [R E  which reduces tax revenues and it is given by  ] [ * R E
t R− ε . If 
* t R− ε , is inelastic then the net effect of a marginal increase in 
* t   is higher tax revenues 
and public transfers which provide higher electoral support to parties. A similar analysis 
explain why an increase in remittances increases tax burdens for voters and the marginal 
electoral costs from taxation for parties when  * t R− ε   is inelastic (see the formal analysis 
in the appendix).
22 
Moreover, if  * t R− ε , is inelastic then the increase in the electoral costs of taxation 
associated with a positive change in remittances outweighs the corresponding marginal 
increase in the parties’ transfers and electoral gains in a targeted redistributive 
program.
23 As a result, a change in the average size of remittances induces parties to 
reduce both the tax rate on full income and the per capita transfer.
24 However, recall 
that the second effect of remittances over 
* T  is a positive income effect which tends to 
increase 
* T . In proposition 3, the sufficient condition in (3.1) implies that the first 
negative effect of remittances on 
* t  and 
* T  dominates the second positive effect 
leading to a net fall of 
* T   (for the formal proof see the appendix).  
 
22 In contrast, if  ) 1 , ( * − −∞ ∈ −t R ε  then  * t R− ε   is elastic. In this case, the electoral costs of taxation and 
the electoral gains from public transfers are negatively associated with a positive change in remittances. 
23 See the discussion about this result after equation (A.8) of the appendix. 
24 The opposite holds if  ) 1 , ( * − −∞ ∈ −t R ε   and higher remittances induces parties to increase  * t . Recall 
that the electoral costs of taxation and gains from public transfers are negatively associated with a positive 
change in remittances. As before, the fall in marginal electoral costs for parties from higher remittances 
outweighs the corresponding fall in political gains and higher remittances induces parties to increase  * t . IKUHO KOCHI AND RAÚL ALBERTO PONCE RODRÍGUEZ  60 
Of particular interest is the fact that the elasticity  R t− ξ  depends on how the political 
process aggregates the preferences for redistribution of voters. To recognize this, we need 
to acknowledge that parties choose a redistributive policy by weighing the preferences 
from those voters who support public redistribution against the interests of voters who 
oppose redistribution. The impact of this political calculus on the government’s response 





α α θ ∫ ∫ =




) ( / ) (  where θ  
is a cost-benefit welfare ratio of the targeted redistributive program. 
The numerator of θ  is a measure of the welfare cost for the society when the 
government takes away $1 from tax payers to fund the public transfers while the 
denominator of  θ  is the welfare gain of transferring $1 to qualified (poor) voters in the 
targeted program. The higher  θ  the more elastic is the government’s response of taxes to 
an increase in private transfers from migrants working abroad and the lower is the 
government’s transfers to the poor for the case  0 ] [ /
* < R dE dt  (for the formal analysis 
see conditions A.10 and A.12 in the appendix).  
 
4.1.    Remittances and Universal Public Transfers 
 
In this section we consider an economy with a universal redistributive program. The 
main difference of this section with our previous analysis relies in the eligibility 
requirement of resident households for receiving public transfers. Under a universal 
redistributive program, resident households pay a tax on full income 
* t  and receive a 
public transfer from the government 
* T  regardless of their earning abilities. Our 
findings are the following: 
 
Proposition 4 For an economy with a tax  0
* > t  applied to full income and 
universal social transfers (all households receive 
* T , an increase in the size of average 
remittances increases the size of the government’s redistributive transfer.   
 
Proof 
See the appendix. ■ 
 
In a universal redistributive program, an increase in the average size of remittances 
increases the parties’ electoral gains and costs in the same proportion. For this reason, an 
increase of the average remittances leaves unchanged the tax rate on full income. 
However, as a result of higher remittances, there is a positive income effect on the 
budget constraint of the government which increases the size of the public transfer.   
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different means affect the government’s redistributive policy.
25 Of related interest is to 
study changes in the private transfers received by households at the upper (lower) end of 
the distribution of income. In Kochi and Ponce-Rodríguez (forthcoming) we provide 
such analysis for a government ruled by a benevolent social planner. In general, this 
analysis suggests that an increase in remittances for households at the lower end of the 
distribution of income reduces the inequality of income, but the response of the 
government’s public transfers to an increase in remittances is ambiguous.
26 
Nevertheless, in our analysis we characterize a set of equilibriums in which higher 
remittances to households at the lower end of the distribution of income are more likely 
to crowd out public transfers under the universal redistributive program in relation to the 
targeted program. In particular, if remittances are received by households with an 
earning ability  n ˆ  that is below the threshold earning ability  n ~  that allows the family 
to beneficiate in the targeted redistributive program, taxes are low before the increase in 
remittances, the remittance-tax elasticity is inelastic,  R t− ξ  is negative and elastic, and 
the household’s social marginal utility is decreasing with income, then an increase in the 
remittances received by households with  n n ~ ˆ <  leads to a fall in the inequality in the 
distribution of income and induces the government to reduce public transfers in the 
targeted and the universal redistributive.   
However, if  ) ( ˆ ~ n E n n < <  where  ) (n E  is the average earning ability, then an 
increase in the remittances received by households with n ˆ  leads to a fall in the 
inequality in the distribution of income and induces the government to reduce public 
transfers in the universal redistributive program but it increases public transfers in the 
targeted program. This result is intuitive and explained as follows: in a targeted 
redistributive program,  n ~  divides the distribution of beneficiaries (those who receive 
transfers) from the distribution of net contributors to the financing of the program (those 
who pay taxes but do not receive transfers). In this case, Pareto efficient redistribution is 
indeed reducing the inequality of the distribution of income between beneficiaries and net 
contributors to the financing of the government’s program. 
Thus, higher remittances for those with  ) ( ˆ ~ : ˆ n E n n n < <  reduce the inequality of the 
overall distribution of income of the economy but spread the socially relevant distribution 
of income that the government seeks to equalize. As a result, the government increases 
 
25 Another justification for the analysis of propositions 3 and 4 is that this approach is useful for empirical 
analysis with macro data. 
26  This outcome is explained by tradeoffs that are similar to those identified in this paper: higher 
remittances received by the poor affect the socially optimal tax structure of the government with taxes going 
up or down depending on certain parametric values of the donor’s reaction to taxes and on the distribution of 
the social marginal utility of income. Moreover, these private transfers also induce a positive shock on the 
budget constraint of the government which tends to increase Pareto efficient transfers. In general, however, 
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transfers in a targeted program. Moreover, in the universal redistributive program, the 
distinction between the socially relevant and actual distribution of income disappears. 
Hence, higher remittances for households with  n ˆ  reduce the inequality of the distribution 
of income and public transfers fall. 
Finally if  n n E n ˆ ) ( ~ < <  then an increase in the remittances received by households 
with  n ˆ  leads to an increase in both the socially relevant and the actual inequality in the 
distribution of income and induces the government to increase public transfers in the 
targeted and the universal redistributive program. 
 
 
5.  DISCUSSION 
 
In this section we discuss some possible extensions to our analysis: first, the role of 
democracy versus autocracy in determining public redistribution. Second, the motivation 
for private transfers, whether remittances are explained by altruism or by other 
incentives, and the response of public transfers to changes in remittances.   
With respect the role of democracy versus autocracy in determining public 
redistribution, the model of Downs (1957) of electoral competition predicts that parties 
propose a moderate redistributive policy that seeks to appeal to a majority of voters. In 
contrast, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001b) argue that autocratic 
systems might exclude a substantial part of individuals from the decision making 
process and, therefore, the extent of redistribution in non democratic economies could be 
smaller (or zero) relative the size of redistributive spending in democratic regimes.
27 
The analysis of Acemoglu and Robinson identifies a class of equilibria in which no 
redistribution takes place in non democratic regimes. An application of this equilibrium 
to the issue analyzed in this paper could suggest that an increase of remittances to 
residents of non democratic economies might lead to an increase in tax revenues, zero 
redistribution, and maybe an increase in military spending. The last conjecture follows 
from the analysis of Olson (1993) who argues that non democratic regimes could use 
military spending to create barriers to political participation for those individuals who 
may oppose the government. Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004) show evidence that 
non democratic regimes have, indeed, higher shares of military spending to GDP relative 
democracies and also tend to create barriers for the development of political opposition.   
The literature has also acknowledged that autocratic governments might seek some 
form of broad political support to maintain power. Hettich and Winer (1999) have 
provided a model in which policy makers design tax policy to maximize political 
 
27 This hypothesis is consistent with empirical evidence by Husted and Kenny (1997) that suggests that 
the U.S. voting acts of the 1960s and 1970s increased the voting franchise and turnout of the poor and led to 
an increase in welfare spending. Aidt et al. (2006) also find that the removal of voting restrictions is 
positively associated with government spending in 12 European countries. DO REMITTANCES CROWD OUT THE GOVERNMENT’S REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY?  63 
support to the regime. Although Hettich and Winer (1999) are mainly concerned with 
tax policy in democratic regimes, the model is general enough to be applied to the 
analysis of fiscal policy of autocratic governments. In their model, the function of 
political support is a weighted sum of the household’s utilities and there is a class of 
equilibria in which autocratic regimes might redistribute in favor of the poor. In this case, 
the tradeoffs for policy makers of tax and transfer policy promoted by changes in the 
size of remittances identified in this paper might still be valid.
28 
With respect the issue of how we rationalize remittances, the literature explains 
inter-vivos private transfers through altruism, see Becker (1984), in which donors 
provide private transfers because their utility depends on the welfare of their relatives. 
Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987), argue that donors could behave according to 
pure self interest and remittances arise because donors expect to receive benefits from 
their parents (such as services, care, attention and inheritances). 
Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest that remittances can also be explained by tempered 
altruism or enlightened self-interest. In this case, remittances are part of a mutual risk 
spreading or investment contract between the migrant and her family. Self interest 
induces all parties to recognize that there are economic gains to be shared if some 
members become migrants while altruism might also play a role in enforcing the 
contract.
29  
In this paper we have limited our attention to altruism as the rationale for remittances. 
However, rational governments will recognize that, contingent to the motivation of 
international private transfers, the response of voters and donors of remittances might 
vary to the government’s tax and transfer policies.
30 This might change the distribution 
of tax burdens and deadweight costs from taxation as well as the distribution of gains 
from public transfers which, ultimately, will have an impact over the welfare and 
political calculus of public redistribution in a way that is not obvious. Future research 
would be desirable to address these and other issues relevant for policy making when 
remittances are explained by self interest or tempered altruism. 
 
28 This is true for the particular case in which the utilities of households are equally weighted in the 
function of political support to be maximized by the government. 
29 For example, a household might seek to spread risks by allocating some members to international 
migration. Initially, the family might support the migrant while remittances could be claims that flow to the 
family at times of hardship. In this setting, altruism might induce all parties to enforce the expected duties of 
each member of the contract. 
30 For example consider the case in which remittances are explained by economic exchange between the 
donor and the recipient. In this case a net increase of public transfers to some household might lead to the 
recipient to reduce her supply of services to the remittances’ donor. Hence, the donor might be forced to 
increase her payments (remittances) to the recipient in order to keep her services. In this case, higher public 
redistribution might lead to higher remittances. The opposite might hold for those voters with a net fall of 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we develop a political economy model with a voting equilibrium to 
study whether an increase in remittances crowds out the redistributive policy of the 
government of the donor’s home country. We also examine if the impact of remittances 
over public transfers differs under two different redistributive policies: a universal and a 
targeted transfer program. 
In our voting equilibrium, the political process leads to a formation of a government 
that designs a redistributive policy to please the average voter of the economy (the 
government produces middle of the road policies). The preferences of voters over public 
redistribution depend on the voter’s relative position in the distribution of income. An 
increase in the flow of remittances changes the distribution of the voters’ preferences for 
public redistribution since remittances change the full income of resident households and 
the parties’ political gains and costs from public redistribution.   
For the economy assumed in this paper, the response of the government’s public 
transfer to remittances depends on the effect of remittances on the tax rate of equilibrium 
that funds the government’s transfers, and on a positive income effect of remittances on 
the budget constraint of the government which tends to increase public transfers. In 
general, the net effect of a change in the distribution of remittances on taxes is 
ambiguous.  
In this paper we show that if the government produces moderate policies, the 
elasticity of remittances with respect taxes is negative and inelastic, and the response of 
taxes from the government to changes in the distribution of income due to remittances is 
negative elastic or unitary, then an increase in the average size of remittances reduces 
both the tax rate on full income and the size of the government’s transfers when the 
redistributive program is targeted to the poor.   
In the universal program of redistribution, an increase in remittances does not affect 
the tax rate of equilibrium but affects positively the budget constraint of the government 
by allowing parties to collect more tax revenue that is translated into higher public 
transfers. As a result, in a universal redistributive program, an increase in the average 
size of remittances actually increases the size of the government’s social transfers in a 





Proposition 3 For an economy with a tax on full income  0
* > t  and the 
government’s redistributive efforts targeted to the poor, there is a crowding out effect of 
remittances on the size of the per capita social transfer of the government if 
 
a)  The elasticity of the government’s response of taxes to changes in remittances, 
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b) The remittance-tax elasticity  * t R− ε  is inelastic. 
 
Proof 
The first order condition for the government’s redistributive policy with an interior 
solution 0
* >




  is equivalent to 
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where  α υ =
k dT d
* /   is the household’s marginal utility of income. Use (A.2) to rewrite 
condition (A.1) as follows 
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Since parties share a common system of beliefs over voting behavior and the strategy 
policy space and candidates are not otherwise differentiated, then parties converge in 
their fiscal platforms toward  k t t
k ∀ =
* *  (for a formal proof of this result see Coughlin 
1992). It follows,  0 = =
−k k ψ ψ  implies  c f f
k k = =
− ) 0 ( ) 0 (  where  0 > c  is a non 
negative constant  ] , [ max 0 n n n∈ ∀ . Use condition (10) of proposition 2 and our 
 
31 To obtain the results in (A.2) consider the following: 
{ }   )] , ( ) 1 ))( , ( ) , ( [( ) , ( ), , ( ( ) , , (
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) , ( * * n t c k  and  ) , ( * * n t k l   are the consumer’s optimal consumption and supply of labor. Then   
































































Use the first order conditions of the consumer’s choice in the condition above to conclude 
] , [ } / ) 1 ( ) ( ) , ( { / max 0
* * * * * * * * n n n dt dR t t R n t n dt d k k k k k ∈ ∀ − − + − = l α υ . 
32 From now on we will write  ) , ( * * a k n t R  as  ) ( * * k t R   when we find convenient. IKUHO KOCHI AND RAÚL ALBERTO PONCE RODRÍGUEZ  66 
definitions for  χ =
* */dt dR  and  ε ε = =
− } / }{ / ) ( {
* * * * *
* * R t dt t dR
t R  to re-express the 
first term of (A.3) as follows   
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Using the definition of the covariance between  X  and Y , ] , [ Y X σ , the next 
condition is satisfied  ] [ ] [ ] [ ] , [ Y E X E XY E Y X − = σ  where  ] [X E , ] [Y E , and  ] [XY E  
are the expectations over  X ,  Y , and the product  XY . Redefine,  α = X  and 
* R Y =  
and use this expression to state the following 
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0 ∫ =  as the average size of remittances received by 
resident households. Hence condition (A.4) is now 
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The government’s budget constraint for an economy with a linear income tax system 
in which taxes on full income are applied to all voters is given by 
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It follows that 
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F r o m  ( A . 6 ) ,  i t  i s  s i m p l e  t o  s e e  t h a t  i f   ) 0 , 1 ( * − ∈
−t R ε  then an increase in  ] [R E  
induces an increase in the households’ tax burdens and the parties’ electoral costs with the 
latter given by  dn n h R E
n
n




) ( ] [ } 1 { . Moreover, from (A.3) and (A.8) an increase in 
] [R E  also leads to higher tax revenues, public transfers, and electoral gains for parties 
from public redistribution. This last effect is given by  dn n h R E
n
n
α ε ∫ +
~  
0
) ( ] [ } 1 { . In contrast, 
if ) 1 , ( * − −∞ ∈
−t R ε  then an increase in  ] [R E  induces a fall in the electoral costs and 
gains for parties. 
Moreover, it is also simple to see that if  ) 0 , 1 ( * − ∈
−t R ε  then an increase in  ] [R E  
leads to a net loss of electoral support to parties while if  ) 1 , ( * − −∞ ∈
−t R ε  then an increase 
in ] [R E  leads to a net gain of electoral support to parties. 
Use (A.6) and (A.7) in condition (A.3) and rearrange terms to obtain 
 




] , [ } 1 {
) (  
) (
1 ) ( } 1 {
) (































































dn R n h
dn n h


























           ( A . 9 )  
 














~    
) ( ) ( ) (  to show 
 
1 ) ( / ) ( 1 ) ( / ) (
~    
~















α α α α θ .            ( A . 1 0 )  
 
Re-arrange terms in (A.8) to obtain 
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) ( ] [ ∫ =  is the average gross labor income of resident 














) ( / ) ( ] [ ] [  is a weighted average of 
the gross labor income. Moreover, note that models of linear income tax systems with 
0
* > t  usually imply that the numerator and denominator of (A.11) are both positive. 
At the political equilibrium rational parties will select taxes such that  0 /
* * > dt dT .
33 
It follows that the marginal effect of remittances on the size of the per capita transfer can 
be obtained by calculating  ] [ /
* R dE dT . To do so, we first find  0 ] [ /
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Since by assumption  0 ] [ ] [ 2 > − θ
ω z E z E  and  ) 0 , 1 ( * − ∈




















θ . Finally, from condition (A.7) obtain  ] [ /
* R dE dT  to show  
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R t = − ξ . The first expression of the right hand side of (A.13) is 
 
33 Rational parties will not set a tax rate on income that reduces marginal tax revenue, or  0 / * * < dt dT , 
since there are feasible lower taxes that reduce their electoral costs from taxation and increases their electoral 
gains from a higher tax revenue that is translated into a higher per capita transfer. For this reason, a tax rate 
that produces  0 / * * < dt dT   cannot belong to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.   DO REMITTANCES CROWD OUT THE GOVERNMENT’S REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY?  69 
negative since  0 ] [ /
* < R dE dT  and  0 /
* * > dt dT  implies that  0 ) 2 1 (
* > − t .
34 Moreover, 
by (a)  ] 1 , ( − −∞ ∈ −R t ξ  hence  0 } 1 { ≤ + −R t ξ . It follows that  0 ] [ /
* < R dE dT . Therefore, 
we conclude that the conditions identified in proposition 3 imply that an increase in the 
average size of remittances crowds out the government’s social transfers. ■ 
 
Proposition 4 For an economy with a tax  0
* > t  applied to full income and 
universal social transfers (all households receive 
* T ), an increase in the size of 
average remittances increases the size of the government’s redistributive transfer.   
 
Proof 
For this economy the parties’ dominant tax strategy is 
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Following similar steps as those shown in proposition 3, it is simple to show that 
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This implies that the response of the government to an increase in the average size of 
 






* * * max
0
max










> + ∫ dn t R n h
n
n
ε  therefore for  0 / * * < dt dT  to hold it must be satisfied that 
0 ) 2 1 ( * < − t . 
35  To obtain (A.14) follow similar steps to those shown in conditions (A.4), (A.5), and (A.6) of 
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